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Abstract
As a small country dependent on foreign trade and investment, North Korea should be highly vulnerable to external 
economic pressure. In June 2009, following North Korea’s second nuclear test, the UN Security Council passed 
Resolution 1874, broadening existing economic sanctions and tightening their enforcement. However, an unintended 
consequence of the nuclear crisis has been to push North Korea into closer economic relations with China and other 
trading partners that show little interest in cooperating with international efforts to pressure North Korea, let alone in 
supporting sanctions. North Korea appears to have rearranged its external economic relations to reduce any impact that 
traditional sanctions could have. 
Given the extremely high priority the North Korean regime places on its military capacity, it is unlikely that the pressure 
the world can bring to bear on North Korea will be sufficient to induce the country to surrender its nuclear weapons. 
The promise of lifting existing sanctions may provide one incentive for a successor government to reassess the country’s 
military and diplomatic positions, but sanctions alone are unlikely to have a strong effect in the short run. Yet the United 
States and other countries can still exercise some leverage if they aggressively pursue North Korea’s international financial 
intermediaries as they have done at times in the past.
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The passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1874 on June 12, 2009 marks a 
new phase in the development of the North Korean nuclear crisis. Until that time, the dominant view 
was that North Korea was probably still engaged in a protracted negotiation. The missile and nuclear 
provocations of 2006 were followed relatively quickly by the signing of important roadmap agreements in 
February and October 2007. Similarly, the haggling over the parties’ respective commitments under these 
two agreements over the course of 2008 and the conflict over a verification protocol could be interpreted 
as a tactical dance. Although the last round of the Six Party Talks in December of 2008 ended in a 
stalemate, the Obama administration was publicly committed to a resumption of the negotiations and a 
broader strategy of engagement. 
Since the missile and nuclear tests of early 2009, however, the mood with respect to North 
Korea’s intentions has turned dourer. Hawks have long argued that North Korea’s provocations and 
delays were simply a means to buy time to secure a credible nuclear deterrent, including the means to 
deliver it. Public statements by North Korea appear to validate this view. In an early test of the Obama 
administration, North Korea stated that it would only relinquish nuclear weapons after relations with the 
United States had been normalized. Following the April 5 test of a multistage rocket, the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) responded quickly through a Presidential Statement that moved to implement 
sanctions provisions under the earlier UN Security Council Resolution 1718, passed in October 2006 
following the country’s first nuclear test. North Korea, claiming that the Security Council’s action was 
a violation of its sovereignty and even an act of war, withdrew from the Six Party Talks, announced its 
intention to reprocess spent fuel rods into fissile material, and ultimately undertook a second nuclear test 
on May 25. When South Korea responded by joining the Proliferation Security Initiative, North Korea 
announced that it would no longer be bound by the terms of the 1953 armistice. Following the passage of 
UNSCR 1874 in June, North Korea once again escalated, claiming that it would weaponize all recently 
reprocessed plutonium, commence a uranium enrichment program, and provide a “decisive military 
response” to any “blockade” against the country. 
In seeking to interpret North Korean actions, it is important to be frank about how little we know. 
There are ample reasons to believe that the country’s behavior is driven not by the external environment 
but by complex domestic developments that include Kim Jong-il’s health, succession struggles, shifts in 
the power of internal factions, and economic changes that have weakened the government’s hold over a 
fraying socialist system. We should not believe that fine-tuning incentives—in the form of either carrots 
or sticks—will necessarily succeed; much will depend on developments in Pyongyang as well.
However, whether the five parties (the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, and Russia) 
renew the push for a negotiated settlement, ratchet up external pressure, or both, it is useful to have some 
understanding of recent changes in the North Korean economy and its external economic relations. These 
changes provide important clues to North Korea’s intentions and are likely to affect the use of either 
sanctions or further economic inducements. 
We make two major points, one having to do with North Korea’s domestic political economy, 
and the second with its foreign sector. First, there is strong evidence from as early as 2005 that the 
leadership has become increasingly wary of economic reform. Our assessments of the causes of this shift 
are necessarily speculative. The onset of the nuclear crisis and a more “hostile” international environment 
clearly do not favor reform, but important domestic dynamics are in play as well. The leadership has 
clearly reverted to a more control-oriented—even Stalinist—approach to economic policy. 
This set of policy changes has important implications for our understanding of North Korean 
intentions as well as for strategies of economic engagement. General economic inducements, such as the 
lifting of sanctions, entry into the international financial institutions (IFIs), or more-formalized regional 
cooperation, have not been as significant for the North Korean leadership as proponents of engagement 
believed they would be. The regime has always favored targeted transfers that can be directly controlled 
by the leadership, such as food aid, heavy fuel oil shipments, or—even better—straight cash payments 
such as those secured from the 2000 North-South summit and the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mt. 
Kumgang projects. But if anything, the current appeal of general economic inducements is even less than 
it has been historically. Moreover, the prospect that reform would moderate North Korean behavior—a 
core assumption of the engagement approach—has proven a chimera. 
The second, and apparently contradictory, set of observations concerns the evolution of North 
Korea’s trade and investment. Despite the recent antireformist turn and the constraints of the second 
nuclear crisis, North Korea has in fact become more economically open. However, the geographic 
composition of North Korea’s trade has shifted quite fundamentally. Trade with Japan has virtually 
collapsed after Tokyo implemented an embargo. Trade with Europe stagnated following the onset of 
the nuclear crisis, while trade, investment, and particularly aid from South Korea fell following the 
inauguration of Lee Myung-bak and especially in 2009. At the same time, North Korea’s dependence on 
China has grown dramatically in both absolute and relative terms. In addition, North Korea has sought 
out other partners that do not pose sanctions risks or with whom North Korea’s nuclear and missile 
interests are aligned, most notably Iran, Syria, and potentially Egypt. 
These shifts in trade patterns have important implications for the recent UN sanctions effort 
and any complementary actions that the United States or other countries might choose to take in the 
aftermath of the May nuclear test. North Korea’s changing trade patterns make it much more difficult, 
although not impossible, to pursue an effective sanctions strategy. In the absence of robust cooperation 
from China, policy would have to target North Korea’s international financial ties or even employ the 
direct interdiction of trade by sea or air; UNSCR 1874 takes important, but by no means decisive, steps 
in this direction. 
Our discussion proceeds in four stages. In the first section, we provide a brief overview of the 
development of the North Korean economy from the collapse of the Soviet Union to the onset of the 
second nuclear crisis. We emphasize the impact of the great famine of the mid-1990s on what we call 
“marketization from below,” the tentative policy changes that culminated in the economic reforms of July 
2002, and the evidence of “reform in reverse” since 2005. 
In the second section, we trace the evolution of the external sector, noting the ongoing ability of 
the country to finance a substantial current account deficit and the steady diversification of its foreign 
economic relations. Of particular interest is the growth in North Korea’s trade and investment with other 
developing countries, most notably in the Middle East, and the related concerns about proliferation 
activities. 
We then examine in greater detail the changing economic relationship with China and South Korea 
following important political breakthroughs with both countries in 2000–2001. We show the growing 
weight of China in North Korea’s external economic relations, the increasingly commercial nature of 
these ties, and the minimal impact the missile and nuclear tests of 2006 had on the growth of China-
North Korea trade and investment. These patterns contrast with North-South economic relations, which 
have been highly political under South Korean presidents Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, and Lee 
Myung-bak. 
In the final section, we provide an overview of the sanctions imposed under UNSCR 1874. The 
resolution sent an important political signal and included several ground-breaking precedents, such as 
a right to monitor, and perhaps interdict, suspected arms sales. Nonetheless, the sanctions are crafted 
cautiously and are likely to have limited effect in the absence of complementary actions by the five parties, 
including not only additional constraints but the olive branch of a return to negotiations. 
The NorTh KoreAN ecoNomy: 1990–2009 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the North Korean economy went into a steep decline, 
culminating in one of the most destructive famines of the twentieth century (Haggard and Noland 
2007a). As many as one-million people—five percent of the entire population—perished in the mid-
1990s. The causes of this collapse were multiple, including long-run distortions associated with the 
socialist growth model as well as the lost opportunities for reform that occurred as a result of the first 
nuclear crisis of 1993–94. However, the failure to adjust to the rapid decline of Soviet support is the 
ultimate reason for the collapse of the North Korean economy in the middle of the decade. When the 
Soviet Union, then Russia, abandoned friendship prices and aid in favor of hard currency payments for 
its exports, both the industrial and agricultural sectors of North Korea went into a secular decline. The 
floods of 1995 were only a final shock, but they cannot be held solely or even primarily responsible for 
the economic collapse and famine, North Korean arguments to the contrary.
In response to the crisis, the North Korean economy began to undergo a profound transformation 
that we call “marketization from below.” Households, work units, local party organs, government offices, 
and even military units all scrambled for food. In doing so, they initiated barter and trade and ventured 
into new, monetized economic activities. Markets began to play a more important role both in generating 
household income and as a source for retail purchases, including food and eventually a wider range of 
consumer goods.1 
A 2008 survey we conducted of 300 North Korean refugees living in South Korea provides insight 
into the extent of this process of informal marketization. We asked respondents whether, in addition 
to their regular work, they engaged in other economic activities. 70.9 percent said they had engaged in 
trading, 8.9 percent in private services, 18.9 percent in “other” business activities, and 14.9 percent in 
August 3 units, entrepreneurial businesses run out of the traditional state-owned enterprises. A surprising 
69 percent of all respondents said that they secured over 50 percent of their income from private business 
activities, and 46 percent said they secured all of their income from private activities. 
The results for household income were mirrored on the expenditure side: Less than 10 percent of 
the respondents in our survey said that their primary source of food at the time they left North Korea was 
the state-run public distribution system (PDS) of quantity rationing or their workplaces. Moreover, there 
is little difference in this response across different dates of departure; if anything, reliance on the market 
appears to have gone up over time. The two most common responses by far to our questions about 
respondents’ primary source of food were that respondents bought food on the market (37.0 percent) or 
that they grew it themselves (27.9 percent).
At the peak of the famine and in its immediate aftermath the regime had little choice but to allow 
this marketization from below. The crucial question was whether the government would ratify these 
developments with complementary policy reforms. In 1998 the leadership introduced constitutional 
revisions that tentatively broadened the space for economic activity outside direct state control. External 
political developments provided some additional hints of an economic opening; these developments 
included the 2000 North-South summit, the resumption of high-level visits with China in 2000 and 
2001, and the Koizumi summit of 2002. These important diplomatic developments appeared to confirm 
that political engagement and economic reform were mutually reenforcing. A relaxation of tensions 
provided the space for the domestic reform effort, but a greater focus on the necessity of reform also 
motivated the leadership to broaden its foreign political and economic relations.
The regime effectively ratified these developments with a set of policy changes announced in July 
2002. There are ample grounds for criticizing this reform as a limited and flawed effort; we discuss it in 
1. The development of a market for food was also aided by substantial diversion of the large inflow of food aid that 
began to arrive beginning in 1995.
more detail elsewhere.2 Nonetheless, it did decriminalize some of the market activities that had sprung up 
during the famine (for example, by allowing the continued growth of controlled markets) and began or 
continued incremental reforms of the cooperatives (for example, by reducing the size of work teams) and 
of state-owned enterprises (for example, by granting greater managerial autonomy). 
Yet the timing of the reform proved highly inauspicious. Within months of the launching of the 
2002 reforms, the second nuclear crisis had broken. In the context of improving harvests and relatively 
generous aid from South Korea and China, an internal debate over the merits of reform continued 
through 2005, primarily in the form of controversy over the weight that should be given to the military 
and heavy industrial sectors as opposed to light industry and agriculture (Carlin and Wit 2006). 
However, by 2005 signs had begun to emerge that economic hardliners were winning the policy battles. 
We consider briefly four examples of “reform in reverse”: 
n	 Developments in the food economy, including efforts to revive the PDS; 
n	 The restrictive response of the government to the development of markets; 
n	 The management of border trade; 
n	 Government statements with respect to overall development strategy, most notably in the joint 
New Year’s editorial of 2009. 
Possible explanations for these changes are as diverse as for North Korea’s recent behavior with 
respect to the nuclear issue. Kim Jong-il’s unveiling of the concept of “military-first politics,” or songun, 
set a new ideological course for the country, signaling that an emphasis would be placed on the military 
as both a model and institution. Military-first politics also had a tangible economic dimension, tilting 
the overall allocation of resources in favor of the military and the military-industrial complex and 
even identifying military industries as a growth sector.3 Arguably, the external environment was also 
to blame. The “hostile policy” of the Bush administration was certainly not conducive to reform or 
reformers, although this argument became less compelling as the second Bush administration belatedly 
embraced negotiations, and it made even less sense following the election of Barack Obama. Moreover, 
it is important to recall that, North Korean claims notwithstanding, the external environment was not 
entirely hostile. To the contrary, the unconditional aid provided by South Korea and China provided the 
government with resources that could be used to reconstitute state control over the economy. 
We are more inclined to the theory that the top leadership and/or conservative forces within the 
regime came to believe that marketization from below was corrosive to state power. The leadership does 
2. See Haggard and Noland (2007a) 176–191.
3. For an analysis of the military’s expanding role in the North Korean economy under the songun policy see Toloraya 
(2008). Toloraya argues that the military opposes economic reform and marketization. Yet the existing military leadership 
could be a beneficiary of reform and opening. North Korea could experience a large “peace dividend” as part of its million-
man army was demobilized and put to work on civilian projects such as the rehabilitation of infrastructure. At least 
some of the military leadership could reinvent themselves as businessmen. See Noland (2000) 302–3 for a quantitative 
assessment.
not appear confident—as the Chinese Communist Party was—that it can maintain a political monopoly 
while simultaneously pursuing economic reform. As will be seen, a recurrent theme of recent economic 
policy is the revealed preference to reassert control over an economic order that appears to be spinning 
out of the central government’s control. 
The Breakdown and reconstitution of the Public Distribution System 
Prior to the great famine of the mid-1990s, the government set production quotas for the cooperatives, 
provided farmers with rations at the time of the harvest, and distributed food to urban residents at 
nominal prices through the PDS; markets played virtually no role in the allocation of grain. During the 
famine, the PDS broke down, and households relied on the market, barter, private farming activities, 
and other private activities such as foraging. The influx of foreign aid in the late-1990s provided the basis 
for a partial revival of the PDS, as donors had no independent channels for distributing food. But the 
process of marketization continued apace driven by partial reforms in the food sector, such as allowing 
some private plots and expanding the role of farmers’ markets. The diversion of food aid and cooperative 
output into the market and growing commercial trade in food across the Chinese border also contributed 
to the growth of market activity. 
However, the government has periodically tried to reinstate the PDS and to exercise control over 
the market for food and grain in particular. In August 2005 the government decided to reinstate the PDS 
as of October 1 and to ban private trading in grain. These actions were taken in conjunction with the 
announcement that the World Food Program (WFP) would be asked to leave North Korea. The ability 
of the government to implement this policy varied across the country, and eventually the government was 
forced to quietly shelve the policy, as PDS sites were not able to meet targets and markets for grain began 
to reemerge. Nonetheless, the effort to revive the PDS involved increased efforts to extract food from the 
cooperatives, even in contravention of the rules determining the disposition of cooperative farm output. 
Such moves intensified in the wake of floods in 2006 and particularly 2007. First, the government 
increased production quotas for the next crop cycle, including through exactions earmarked for the 
military. Second, the government began to crack down on “embezzlement” and “corruption” on the part 
of cooperative managers, even when such practices probably reflected an effort on the part of cooperative 
managers to protect their members. Third, new restrictions were placed on private plots and cooperative 
leasing of land in an effort to redirect effort back into cooperative work.  
Through a reconstruction of aggregate food balances, an analysis of prices, and direct observation 
by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and WFP observers, we now know that the food situation in 
North Korea was more precarious in 2008 than at any time since the great famine (Haggard and Noland 
forthcoming). These shortages help explain the willingness of the North Korean government to engage in 
negotiations over a large food aid package with the United States, concluded in May 2008, and may have 
influenced its willingness to negotiate over the broader nuclear issues as well. But in other respects, the 
2007–08 crop cycle showed the continuing preference for controls and resistance to outside involvement 
in the food economy, most clearly visible in the decision in May 2009 to terminate the 500,000 metric 
ton food aid program with the United States.
responding to markets and Traders
The breakdown of the PDS and the emergence of markets pose important challenges for the government 
not only vis-à-vis the countryside but in the urban and industrial sectors as well. The first is the migration 
of labor out of the state sector and into market activities, and the corresponding weakening of the state-
owned enterprise sector. The second is the breakdown of what is left of the socialist social contract. 
Households dependent on the market have been forced to pay rapidly rising prices. North Korea’s food 
problems have increasingly come to resemble those in market economies, in which prices, rather than 
aggregate supplies, are the determinants of hunger and malnutrition; this was particularly true in the 
spring and summer of 2008 as we show elsewhere in some detail (Haggard and Noland forthcoming). 
A final problem posed by the markets is an informational one. General markets have been 
strengthened by the burgeoning cross-border trade with China in consumer goods. This trade has revealed 
the higher quality of Chinese and other foreign products. But it has also included a wide array of cultural 
products that directly undermine ideological control and the government’s monopoly on information: 
from small televisions capable of receiving Chinese broadcasts in border areas to South Korean music 
videos and DVDs and even mobile phones. The campaign against the market is not just economic in 
nature but has a strong ideological component, emphasizing the subversive antisocialist nature of market 
activities.
As a result of these challenges, the recent effort to exercise control over the market has not been 
limited to food, but has included a wider assault on market activity. This campaign began with the 
imposition of escalating age restrictions on market traders in the fall of 2007, ultimately banning women 
under 50 from trading in general markets. From mid-January 2008 the government has also stepped up 
inspections on the general markets, or jangmadang, in an effort to control the range of goods offered, with 
the apparent intention of reverting to the more-limited farmers’ markets that were permitted to trade only 
in supplementary foodstuffs. In October 2008 North Korean authorities issued a decree through local 
commerce management offices around the country ordering all permanent markets to open only once 
every ten days. There have also been periodic reports of efforts to control prices. Control efforts intensified 
in early 2009, with bans on a variety of foreign products that have been increasingly important to the 
burgeoning retail trade.
It is doubtful that these efforts at control have been successful; indeed, the recurrence of new 
control efforts is almost certainly a sign of their failure. Age restrictions can be circumvented by bringing 
grandparents into the market. Regulated markets—and efforts to close them—have given rise to “alley 
markets” that shift trading to new venues. Traders undoubtedly bribe inspectors as well. However, the 
restrictions have nonetheless sowed uncertainty about alternative sources of livelihood for households, and 
in 2008 did so just as soaring food prices forced households to seek other sources of income and barter. 
There is also some evidence that the efforts to exercise control over markets may influence cross-
border trade as well. Larger trading entities in the land ports along the border, particularly in Sinuiju, 
have fallen under government scrutiny. In a noteworthy development in April 2008, the central 
government dispatched a team of 200 investigators to Sinuiju in the name of an Antisocialist Conscience 
Investigation to inspect the books of foreign trade organizations, necessarily affecting market activity as a 
result. 
We doubt that the effort to impose controls is likely to generate an overt social or political backlash; 
the barriers to collective action in North Korea are well known. But an interesting episode in March 2008 
in Chongjin suggests complex political risks for the regime: The markets themselves could become the 
locus of protest and everyday forms of resistance. In early March city officials sought to enforce the age 
restriction on female traders. In what appeared to be a coordinated action across several markets in the 
city, large groups of women staged protests against the ban on trading on March 4. Municipal authorities 
took the unusual step of reopening the markets under the authority of the local ministry of labor on 
March 5 but were subsequently compelled to enforce the ban at the insistence of the central government. 
The episode reveals the complex pressures on local officials squeezed between the dictates of Pyongyang, 
the absence of resources, mounting political and social pressures, and the risks of further repression.
The Border Problem
The dramatic increase in trade with China has resulted in the creation of dense business networks that 
include major Chinese and North Korean enterprises, smaller Chinese and North Korean businesses, 
and North Koreans with relatives in China who are permitted to travel, albeit only with the greatest 
of difficulty. The major land ports on the North Korean side of the border, particularly Sinuiju, have 
become not only trading centers but major distribution hubs for the rest of the country. 
But the border poses profound challenges to the North Korean leadership. When economic 
circumstances deteriorate, the incentives rise to move into China either permanently or in search of 
business opportunities and food. With this movement comes the gradual breakdown of the government’s 
monopoly on information about the outside world and a corresponding difficulty in maintaining the 
regime’s mythology about the superiority of the socialist system. The border also poses a variety of more-10
direct economic problems. Illicit border trade in drugs, particularly methamphetamines, has been widely 
reported as has the smuggling of scrap metal and other products that reflect the looting of state-owned 
enterprises and public infrastructure. 
Prior to changes in the North Korean penal code in 2004, a person who illegally crossed a “frontier 
of the Republic” faced a sentence of up to three years in a political penal labor colony, or gwalliso, but 
those who did not appear politically dangerous were sent to a village unit labor camp, where they would 
spend between three months and three years in forced labor. Those classified as “political offenders” faced 
more-severe penalties. In “serious” cases, defectors or asylum seekers were subjected to indefinite terms 
of imprisonment and forced labor, confiscation of property, or death. Regulations under the 2004 penal 
code appear to have codified the differential treatment between economic refugees and those cases deemed 
political, stipulating lighter sentences for those crossing for economic reasons. Yet not surprisingly, the 
legal revisions did not necessarily reflect reality: Interviews with refugees suggest that judicial proceedings 
were usually skipped, torture remained prevalent in detention facilities, and death rates in incarceration 
were high. 
The recurrence of severe food shortages following the floods of 2007, however, was accompanied 
by a dramatic crackdown on border movements, a crackdown that accelerated as the Tumen River began 
to freeze in the early winter. From November 2007 reports from North Korea began to indicate the 
organization of Antisocialist Conscience Investigation Patrols to control internal movements in North 
Hamkyung province and to confiscate “contraband.” The most dramatic signal sent by the regime was 
the public execution of 15 people, 13 of them women, in Onsung on February 20, 2008 on charges of 
trafficking. But sentences have also been increased; single border crossings not related to South Korea 
or having political overtones that were previously overlooked now carry sentences of three years, with 
those found guilty of multiple crossings—even if not political—receiving sentences of up to ten years. 
In an interesting signal of the seriousness attached to this issue and concerns about the pervasiveness of 
corruption along the border, the police have even been granted new authority to incarcerate without 
going through prosecutors and to exercise some control over border security agents and even military 
personnel. 
The economic implications of these new restrictions are impossible to estimate; the illicit border 
trade is relatively small and remittances passed through informal channels are unlikely to be very large 
either. However, the border has represented a partial escape valve both through movement and trade, and 
the obvious opportunities for growth that would come from greater openness and movement across the 
border are foregone. 11
economic Strategy: The January 2009 Joint editorial and the return to chollima
At roughly the same time that the leadership introduced the concept of military-first politics, or songun, 
it also rolled out the goal of creating a “strong and prosperous nation.” This nationalist concept is plastic 
enough to accommodate a variety of means for achieving it; indeed it could be used as a political device 
to jettison more-problematic aspects of state socialism and the concept of self-reliance, or juche, and 
to initiate wide-ranging reforms. Such an approach has historical antecedents that include the Meiji 
Restoration (to whose slogans current North Korean formulations bear more than a passing resemblance) 
as well as the founding of modern Turkey under Mustafa Kemal. 
However, the 2009 New Year’s joint editorial, a crucial document setting the general outlines of 
policy for the year, suggests that reformist forces are in retreat.4 The most general theme of the editorial 
is a return to the mobilizational development strategies of the 1950s Chollima movement, culminating 
in the public announcement of a “150-day speed battle campaign” in May.5 The editorial directly quotes 
Kim Jong-il on this point: “The whole country and all the people, as in those years of bringing about 
a great Chollima upsurge after the war, should launch a general offensive dynamically, sounding the 
advance for opening the gate to a great, prosperous and powerful nation, united closely around the Party 
with one mind and purpose.” 
With respect to sectoral priorities, the editorial leads with the metal industry as “the mainstay of 
our independent socialist economy,” and gives pride of place to other heavy-industry sectors, including 
machine building and chemicals. Early pronouncements within the party contained quite precise 
production goals: to generate 7.76 million kilowatts of electricity a year, produce 33 million metric tons 
of metal, 13 million metric tons of coal, to move 72 million metric tons of freight, and so on. However, 
given shortages of both power and raw materials, the campaign reverted to strategies that would rely more 
directly on the mobilization of labor, such as housing construction and farming. 
Of particular interest is the role that the military is seen to play in this process, not only as defender 
but as a strategic sector: “Great efforts should constantly be put to the development of the defense 
industry as required by the line of economic construction in the songun era and everything necessary be 
provided for it on a preferential basis.” As we will see in more detail below, such a strategic focus is by no 
means limited to the supply of the North Korean military but seeks to upgrade North Korea’s status as a 
major arms exporter. 
4. Korean Central News Agency, “Joint New Year Editorial Issued,” January 1, 2009, available at www.kcna.co.jp/
index-e.htm (accessed July 13, 2009).
5. On Chollima see Noland (2000) 63.1
Whither reform? 
It is important to underscore a very important point about authoritarian regimes, and particularly 
personalist ones: They can quickly shift directions. There is nothing about this new course that could 
not, in principle, be reversed were the leadership to choose to reprioritize reform. However, policy 
choices have political-economy as well as economic consequences. In a “virtuous cycle” model, even 
partial reforms can generate improved economic performance, new stakeholders, and associated demands 
to push the process further and tolerate increased private activity. In a “vicious cycle” model, weak or 
erratic commitment to reform deters investment and trade, with the result that the reforms do not 
appear to work. Moreover, the reversion to controls provides ample opportunities for corruption, as 
“gatekeepers”—those responsible for enforcing controls—are effectively granted new opportunities for 
rent-seeking. As a result, the reform process becomes corrupted and associated with corruption as well. 
An additional source of concern has to do with the external sector. As legitimate sources of revenue 
decline, aid dries up, and trade sanctions are tightened, the incentives to proliferate and engage in illicit 
activities such as drug trafficking and counterfeiting obviously increase; we place these concerns in the 
broader context of the evolution of the external sector. 
DeveloPmeNTS iN The exTerNAl SecTor
It is common to argue that North Korea should pursue a Chinese-style reform path, but for a number of 
reasons agricultural reforms are unlikely to be as central to North Korea’s transformation as they were in 
China and Vietnam. Not only is North Korea’s agricultural sector very much smaller than in those two 
socialist countries, but the relatively limited amount of arable land and the country’s northerly latitude, 
short growing seasons, and vulnerability to both floods and drought all argue strongly against the prospect 
that the agricultural sector could lead the reform process. 
Rather, the most auspicious path of transformation would be to follow a course similar, at least in 
broad outlines, to that of South Korea. This strategy would exploit North Korea’s proximity to larger, 
more advanced economies (including China as well as South Korea and Japan) and use both foreign 
investment and multilateral assistance to support increased trade, including through investment in trade-
related infrastucture (e.g., ports and export-processing zones). Investment and exports would finance 
not only the imports needed to revive the North Korean economy but also the food that has been in 
continuous short supply since the famine.
What has happened in fact? The broad development of North Korea’s foreign economic relations 
since 1990 appears to follow developments in the economy more generally: Figure 1 provides an overview 
of North Korea’s exports and imports from 1990 through 2008. Both exports and imports declined 
precipitously in the first half of the 1990s, bottoming out around 1998. Since that time, trade has shown 1
a steady recovery, growing without interruption through the onset of the second nuclear crisis, though 
not attaining 1990 levels until 2007. 
However, a closer examination of the patterns of trade reveals quite fundamental changes in the 
nature of North Korea’s foreign economic relations. A first point to note from figure 1 is that imports 
consistently outstrip exports: The country has run a current account deficit over the entire period, 
implying offsetting capital inflows. Prior to the political developments of the early 1990s, these deficits 
were effectively financed by aid from North Korea’s socialist patrons. In some cases, this “aid” took the 
form of the inability or unwillingness of North Korean firms to make required cash or barter payments; 
in effect, North Korea accumulated arrears. However, first the Soviet Union and Russia, and then 
China, largely abandoned trade at friendship prices. As a result, North Korea’s trade with Russia almost 
completely collapsed. Aid has continued to play some role in financing North Korea’s current account 
deficit, including ongoing assistance from China as well as multilateral and bilateral food aid. But there is 
ample anecdotal evidence that foreign direct investment has played an increasing role in financing North 
Korea’s current account deficit over time, both through the Kaesong Industrial Complex and through a 
variety of projects with Chinese and other investors (Haggard and Noland 2007b).
Trade has not only grown, but the political geography of North Korea’s foreign commercial 
relations appears to have undergone some profound shifts since the onset of the second nuclear crisis 
in 2002. Establishing this fact is by no means straightforward; data on North Korean trade flows are 
available from a variety of sources, but they exhibit substantial discrepancies. Some of these problems 
are presumably due to recording errors at the original source, meaning that there is some irreducible 
level of uncertainty about the specifics of North Korean trade.6 These difficulties are compounded by the 
existence of trade in weapons and illicit activities, including drug exports and counterfeiting of currency 
and other products, as well as the fact that some of North Korea’s trading partners do not report trade 
data either; Iran provides a noteworthy example. 
With these caveats in mind, we have taken a fairly simple approach that seeks to provide a snapshot 
of North Korea’s trade relations since the onset of the nuclear crisis by focusing on its top ten trading 
partners for 2004–07. We rely primarily on KOTRA data but supplement it with data from the IMF and 
6. Even North Korea’s merchandise trade is regarded as a state secret and must be constructed on the basis of mirror 
statistics reported by partner countries. The major sources for such exercises are the Korean Trade-Investment 
Promotion Agency (KOTRA), the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS), and 
the UN COMTRADE database. KOTRA and DOTS provide data on North Korea’s overall merchandise trade 
balance and a bilateral breakdown of North Korean trade, and mirror statistics from COMTRADE make available 
the commodity composition of North Korean trade; the latter is an important check on the veracity of trade with 
some countries. Simply reconciling conflicting data from these sources has been the subject of a number of separate 
research projects. For some recent efforts to construct consistent trade estimates, see Haggard and Noland (2007b), 
Nanto and Chanlett-Avery (2008), and Marumoto (2008) 55–68. 1
the UN.7 In particular, there are a number of countries that KOTRA has chosen to omit but for which 
we believe the trade figures reported by the IMF and the UN are plausible. We have also investigated 
those cases in which either absolute trade or the discrepancies between KOTRA and the IMF data are 
large—over $10 million—by considering the commodity composition of trade using COMTRADE data; 
these data allow us to eliminate some trade that appears anomalous. The results are reported in table 1, 
and as with all such exercises should be treated with an appropriate degree of caution. 
Several patterns stand out. The first is a high and growing dependence on developing countries. 
Particularly noteworthy is the growth of trade with the Middle East, which appears to have grown 
roughly twice as fast as North Korea’s trade with the rest of the world (figure 2). This finding is even more 
striking given that a number of countries that have documented trade with North Korea in arms report 
no trade at all, including Iran, Syria, and Yemen. It is precisely with these countries that North Korea has 
been engaged in proliferation activities, ranging from some role in the construction of a nuclear reactor in 
the Syrian desert, to missile sales, to murky “service contracts” with a range of countries in conjunction 
with arms exports. Topping the list of these purchasers since the onset of the second nuclear crisis are 
Iran, Syria, Yemen, and Vietnam, but the appearance of Myanmar on the list of top-ten recipients of 
North Korean exports is also of interest.8
Three countries—Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon—report nonnegligible trade on a consistent 
basis, and it is the data for these three that form the basis of the index reported in figure 2. As noted 
above, the index likely understates the true growth of trade between North Korea and the region. In 
addition to trade, the Egyptian conglomerate Orascom has entered into contracts for investment worth 
more than $500 million (Noland 2009b). If actualized, this would be the largest non-Chinese, non–
South Korean investment in North Korea since the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet 
Union. Egypt has allegedly purchased North Korean missiles in the past, and the Iranian nuclear weapons 
development program has led to talk of Saudi-Egyptian cooperation to produce an “Arab bomb.” North 
Korean technology and expertise could be of interest in this regard. 
A second set of developments concerns North Korea’s trade with its Northeast Asian neighbors. 
Japan’s reaction to the onset of the nuclear crisis is clearly visible in the sharp decline in its trade with 
North Korea. In 2004 the country accounted for 3 percent of North Korea’s imports and took fully 11 
percent of its exports. By 2007 trade had dropped to a trickle. By contrast North Korea’s reliance on 
China and South Korea has grown. However, the nature of trade with these two partners has shown very 
different patterns, as can be seen by examining them in more detail. 
7. These sources are: Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA), “2007 Trends in North Korea’s Foreign 
Trade” (in Korean) at www.kotra.or.kr (accessed on June 24, 2009); International Monetary Fund (IMF), Direction 
of Trade Statistics (DOTS) CD-Rom, June 2009; and the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
(COMTRADE), available at http://comtrade.un.org/ (accessed on June 24, 2009). 
8. For an overview of North Korea’s proliferation activities, see Bechtol (2009).1
North Korea-china Trade
North Korea’s trade with China during and immediately after the great famine bore important similarities 
to the process of marketization from below described above. Not only did work units and households 
engage in domestic trade in order to secure food, but those with access or proximity to the border also 
initiated new trading relationships with China. 
Viewed from the North Korean side, these trade relations ranged from officially sanctioned trade 
conducted through state-owned trading companies to transactions that exploited family connections with 
the Korean Chinese community in the Chinese border provinces. In this latter category, some “trade” 
probably included unrequited transfers to relatives. In between these two ideal types of official and private 
commercial interactions has been a very wide gray-area of trade that appears to have a strong commercial 
component, even if it is conducted by state-owned enterprises. 
Viewed from the Chinese side, we have data from 2003 through 2007 (excluding 2004) on the 
share of trade accounted for by firms of different ownership: private, state-owned, and foreign invested 
enterprises, or multinationals (figure 3). In 2003 less than a quarter of China’s trade with North Korea 
passed through private companies and none through multinationals. In 2007 more than half of the trade 
was through private Chinese companies, and multinationals accounted for roughly 10 percent. In short, 
trade across the Chinese border is increasingly commercial in form. Further indirect evidence of the 
commercialization of China-North Korea ties is the sharp increase in North Korea’s exports to China. 
This increase in exports would be consistent with declining tolerance on the part of private Chinese firms 
for arrears and the corresponding pressure on North Korean firms to earn foreign exchange in order to 
finance imports. 
Figure 4 provides monthly data on China’s bilateral trade with North Korea. As can be seen, trade 
has expanded steadily since the onset of the nuclear crisis. Exports to North Korea have also outstripped 
imports from it, implying a bilateral trade deficit financed in part by growing foreign direct investment by 
Chinese enterprises. If our assumption of increasing commercialization is correct, then trade growth is no 
doubt explained in no small measure by China’s booming economy. However, the growth in trade with 
China may also have been given an unintended boost by the onset of the nuclear crisis. Both push and 
pull factors were at work. On the one hand, the crisis resulted in an effective Japanese embargo and US 
financial sanctions on Banco Delta Asia that interrupted the country’s commercial relations not only with 
Macau but elsewhere too. On the other hand, China’s de facto strategy of engagement with North Korea 
persisted, providing an implicit framework for closer economic integration. In a more-thorough study 
of trade during this period, including some simple econometric tests, we found that North Korea’s 2006 
nuclear test and the imposition of UN Security Council sanctions had no perceptible effect on North 
Korea’s trade with China; this finding has important implications for the likely outcome of the current 
sanctions program if not supplemented by additional measures (Noland 2009a). 1
It is interesting to note that despite its proximity to China and the obvious complementarities that 
would come from deepening the bilateral relationship, the North Korean regime has been unwilling 
or unable to pursue the export-processing zone model with China. The early effort to experiment with 
an export-processing zone in Rajin-Sonbong faced a host of obstacles and failed to attract significant 
investment (Noland and Flake 1997). Although near both China and Russia, the zone’s location on the 
Northeast coast did not exploit existing centers of economic activity on which it could build, as the early 
Chinese coastal zones did. Weak infrastructure, both physical and legal, and an unwillingness to extend 
significant concessions all conspired against the project. In late 2008 North Korean authorities even took 
the step of seeking to expel resident Chinese businessmen in the zone. The strange effort to establish a 
Sinuiju Special Administrative Region (SAR), modeled in detail on the Macao and Hong Kong SAR’s 
and to be administered by Chinese entrepreneur Yang Bin, collapsed in 2002 when Yang was arrested 
by Chinese authorities. Despite recurrent rumors that the SAR or zone idea would be revived in Sinuiju, 
to date there has been no progress in taking the measures required to increase foreign investment into 
Sinuiju. As a result of this failure to pursue an export-processing zone model, investment relations remain 
highly particularistic. 
To explore some of the constraints on foreign direct investment in North Korea, we conducted a 
survey in 2008 of 250 firms from the Chinese border provinces doing business in the country (as well as 
a control group of enterprises not doing business there). Although most of these companies were engaged 
only in trade, and what appear to be something akin to spot-market transactions at that, 70 claimed to 
have some form of investment in North Korea. We asked them a series of questions about the constraints 
on their businesses. Not surprisingly, the quality of infrastructure figured prominently in their responses: 
92 percent of investors agreed or strongly agreed that the quality of basic infrastructure was a problem for 
their business, and 94 percent agreed that the ban on cell phones was a constraint. 
Yet property-rights concerns also figured prominently. 65 percent agreed or strongly agreed that 
it is risky to invest in North Korea because assets may be expropriated outright. 77 percent said that 
regulations in North Korea make it hard to do business, and 81 percent said that it was dangerous to 
invest because the government can change the rules. 54 percent of all firms in the sample said that it was 
necessary to bribe officials to do business in North Korea; however, among investors this share rose to 73 
percent, underlining the vulnerability of investing as opposed to trading. These bribes are not trivial: 53 
percent of investors claimed that they spent more than 10 percent of annual income on bribes. Although 
the North Koreans have accommodated substantial inflows of Chinese investment, our survey suggests 
that these relationships have not served to socialize the regime to international commercial practices. 
Rather, they have been undertaken by state-owned enterprises and cemented through corruption. 1
North-South Trade
Figure 5 traces the development of South Korea’s trade relations with the North. In contrast to the steady 
increase visible in bilateral North Korea-China trade, a close inspection of figure 5 shows the substantial 
politicization of trade not only under President Lee Myung-bak, but under Presidents Kim Dae-jung 
and Roh Moo-hyun as well. Trade did not begin in earnest until the initiation of the Sunshine Policy 
under Kim Dae-jung in 1998. But even following the summit of 2000, North Korea proved reluctant to 
negotiate legal protocols to govern bilateral trade and investment. Trade remained relatively flat through 
the end of the Kim Dae-jung administration before beginning a more-erratic expansion under Roh Moo-
hyun. However, it is important to underscore that this inflection was driven in no small measure by aid 
and the construction of the two major investment projects at Kaesong and Mt. Kumgang; exports from 
Kaesong did not even begin until 2005. 
Despite the Roh administration’s reputation as a relentless advocate of engagement, trade was 
interrupted by the missile and nuclear tests of 2006 before taking off in 2007 following the resumption 
of the Six Party Talks and the location of more enterprises in the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC). 
At the October 2007 summit the outgoing Roh administration outlined an ambitious set of economic 
cooperation projects, promises that the North Koreans viewed not as the product of a particular 
administration but as a more-binding bilateral commitment. 
The election of December 2007 fundamentally changed the nature of North-South economic 
relations. The Lee Myung-bak administration moved toward a more-conditional concept of engagement 
in which expanded trade, investment, and even humanitarian assistance would follow rather than lead 
progress on the nuclear question. Nor was this commitment altogether disingenuous; even in the wake 
of the freeze in bilateral relations over the course of 2008, the Lee administration nonetheless budgeted 
nearly $1.2 billion for inter-Korean cooperative projects for 2009. These included the construction of an 
East Sea line inter-Korean import facility and joint-use yard, capital loans for Hyundai Asan economic 
cooperative projects, food and fertilizer assistance, financing for NGO aid to the North, loans to cover 
expenses of the KIC Management Committee, and the construction of a KIC general support center. By 
mid-2009, virtually none of this money had been spent. 
It is important to note that from the beginning, North-South trade has had a strong aid 
and noncommercial component. Even nominally commercial trade has a substantial strategic and 
noncommercial cast. The Mt. Kumgang tourist project and the KIC have involved private companies 
but also substantial government subsidies. These subsidies are of particular interest in the KIC case, since 
export-processing zones typically involve concessions and support on the part of the recipient country 
rather than from investors.9 
9. Through its Inter-Korea Cooperation Fund, the South Korean government initially offered companies 1
Figure 6 divides South Korea’s exports to the North into three categories—commercial trade, 
cooperation projects (primarily Mt. Kumgang and the KIC), and noncommercial trade or aid—and 
compares them with our estimates of Chinese aid. Between 1995 and 2007 South Korea’s aid and 
economic cooperation activities together have at times accounted for almost 60 percent of total trade 
and have averaged more than 40 percent of trade over this period. Aid and other noncommercial exports 
from South Korea have increasingly outstripped even our highest estimates of Chinese aid. Under the 
government of newly elected President Lee Myung-bak, the relative magnitudes of these noncommercial 
transactions have decreased, as South Korean policy emphasized a more-conditional approach. 
Nonetheless, the irony is inescapable: Up through the Lee Myung-bak administration, South Korea’s 
trade with the North has been less commercial in nature than North Korea’s trade with China. 
The highly politicized nature of North-South trade brought risks for both sides. Both the Kim 
Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations were clear in seeing economic engagement as a means to 
leverage reform in North Korea. Yet at the same time, the fact that commercial trade and investment 
outside of the KIC was circumscribed meant that the project came to have substantial political as well as 
economic significance for the South. Despite pressures to respond to the 2006 missile and nuclear tests by 
reexamining the KIC, the Roh administration chose to largely insulate this experiment from high politics. 
The Lee Myung-bak administration initially followed suit, despite a more-conditional approach to other 
aspects of the North-South relationship.
North Korea has not shown similar restraint. As a result, the politics of the KIC exhibit what might 
be called “reverse leverage”: rather than the KIC moderating North Korean behavior and encouraging the 
spread of reform, Pyongyang has sought to manipulate South Korea’s high sunk costs in the KIC to place 
pressure on the Lee Myung-bak administration. The recent KIC saga began in July 2008, following the 
killing of a tourist at Mt. Kumgang, when North Korea delayed approval for South Koreans traveling to 
Kaesong and the industrial complex. The North said that this action was taken in response to delays in the 
delivery of equipment for a new military communications channel, which the South had withheld because 
of the Mt. Kumgang incident. At this point, South Korean investors began to hedge their bets, running 
down inventories and postponing planned expansions of activity. North Korea’s so-called December 
1 actions of 2008 suspended train operations and tourism, closed an economic cooperation office, and 
ordered the South to withdraw half the staff of the KIC Management Committee. Again, specific political 
concerns were cited, including the Lee administration’s unwillingness to fulfill promises made at the 2000 
entering Kaesong low-interest loans; virtually all firms initially entering the zone took advantage of this support. 
The government also provides political risk insurance covering financial losses up to 90 percent of a company’s 
investment, up to five billion South Korean won ($5.4 million). In addition, a law passed in April 2007 allowed 
South Korean small and medium-sized enterprises (SME’s) operating in the KIC to access supports, such as 
preferential finance programs, extended to SME’s in the South.1
and particularly the 2007 North-South summits as well as concerns about antiregime leaflets spread via 
balloon by South Korean activists. A particularly telling feature of the events of December 2008 was the 
visit to Kaesong of Lt. General Kim Yong-chol of the National Defense Commission and the thinly veiled 
effort to enlist KIC-invested South Korean enterprises to provide domestic pressure on the Lee Myung-
bak administration’s policies. In March 2009 North Korea took its first steps to rewrite rules—and 
extract rents—by enforcing environmental standards and levying fines for labor violations. The effective 
shutdown of the park in March was a side-effect—perhaps even unintended—of the suspension of an 
inter-Korean military communication channel in response to US military exercises. But by May, North 
Koreans were declaring existing contracts with respect to land rent, land-use taxes, and wages null and 
void and even held a South Korean hostage at the complex on charges that he was engaged in politics. 
As of this writing, North and South are engaged in a tense negotiation over what concessions, if any, the 
South is willing to make and thus about the very future of the entire enterprise. 
Much of the discussion of the KIC saga has focused on whether the North Koreans really mean 
it, or whether these moves constitute efforts to renegotiate contracts on more-favorable terms. This 
discussion misses a central point. The real costs of recent North Korean actions include not only the KIC 
itself but any investment that is deterred by the propensity of the North Korean leadership to subordinate 
economic and reputational calculations to broader political objectives. As we have seen from the aggregate 
data, weak property rights do not deter foreign direct investment altogether; Chinese and other firms have 
invested, in some cases large amounts of money, as recent Orascom investments demonstrate. These firms 
have clearly found some way to secure their investments, in part through the formation of joint ventures 
with partners who provide not only complementary assets—typically land—but political protection as 
well. But such arrangements are not likely to be adequate to secure major foreign investments from South 
Korea, Japan, the United States, and Western Europe, even if the nuclear issue were to be resolved. 
The UN SANcTioNS AND Their limiTS
Following the nuclear test of October 2006, the United States was able to orchestrate a UN Security 
Council Resolution, UNSCR 1718 (UNSC 2006),  that included sanctions targeting major weapons 
systems and luxury goods. Yet, as noted above, we have found no evidence that either the test or the 
sanctions have had substantial effects on North Korea’s trade with China (Noland 2009a). Relatively 
rapid resumption of negotiations on US financial sanctions paved the way for agreements in February 
2007 that opened a nearly two-year cycle of Six Party Talks, which ended inconclusively at the very end 
of the Bush administration’s tenure in December 2008. 
UNSCR 1874 (UNSC 2009) of June 12, 2009 goes beyond UNSCR 1718 in both the scope of 
products covered and particularly in the means of enforcing the sanctions. As with the earlier resolution, 0
UNSCR 1874 calls on North Korea to cease and desist development of its nuclear and missile programs 
and to return to the Six Party Talks, the Nonproliferation Treaty, and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) safeguards.
With respect to product coverage, UNSCR 1718 focused on trade in major weapons system, 
all products related to the production of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and luxury goods 
imported by the elite. The new resolution extends sanctions to include all arms-related trade, as well as 
to all training or assistance related to it (UNSC 2009, paragraph 10). The latter is particularly important 
because North Korea not only exports weapons systems but has recently engaged in various forms of 
collaboration on both missile and nuclear technologies, including with both Iran and Syria. 
It is important to underscore that the resolution does not constitute a trade embargo on North 
Korea nor does it even target nonmilitary commercial trade. The resolution does contain one general 
sanction not related to arms trade: It calls on both international institutions and member states not 
to undertake new grants, financial assistance, or concessional loans to North Korea and asks that they 
maintain “vigilance” with respect to current aid programs (UNSC 2009, paragraph 19). For the most 
part, however, the sanctions are highly targeted around weapons-related activities, and humanitarian 
assistance and support for denuclearization are also specifically excluded from coverage. 
It is important to underscore that the resolution sets a floor rather than a ceiling on what individual 
states can do; Japan quickly moved to impose a complete embargo on the country. Moreover, some 
countries may interpret the scope of product coverage quite broadly. For example, some North Korean 
enterprises engage in both weapons-related trade and other commercial activities; the resolution would 
not prevent the targeting of such companies if it were legitimately believed that they were engaged in 
prohibited trade. 
The most interesting features of the resolution have to do with means of enforcement. In 2003 
President Bush launched the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a loose effort to secure international 
cooperation in monitoring and interdicting ships that might be trafficking in WMDs or WMD-related 
materials.10 The new Security Council resolution comes close to making the PSI a formal multilateral 
effort. The resolution “calls upon,” but does not require, member states to inspect all cargo on their 
territory, including at both seaports and airports, if it is believed to contain prohibited items (UNSC 
2009, paragraph 11). Moreover, it authorizes members to inspect vessels on the high seas or to escort 
them to port if there are reasonable grounds to believe that they are carrying prohibited cargo. It also 
precludes the provision of bunkering services to any ship suspected of prohibited trade, placing an 
additional constraint on any suspect ship.
10. South Korea, which sat on the fence under the previous government of Roh Moo-hyun, formally joined the PSI 
effort following the second nuclear test.1
An important loophole is that such interdiction must have the consent of the country under which 
the vessel is flagged; acting under Chapter VII, Article 41, UNSCR 1874 does not authorize the use 
of force. If the flag state does not consent, then “the flag state shall direct the vessel to proceed to an 
appropriate and convenient port for the required inspection” (UNSC 2009, paragraph 13). However, 
North Korea probably transports most prohibited materials under its own flag, and this provision 
could provide additional incentives for North Korea to do so. Nonetheless, the resolution does impose 
constraints because the major flags of convenience, such as Panama and Liberia, will come under strong 
pressure to comply, while North Korea’s pariah status makes even normal commercial trade carried under 
its own flag suspect. Even in the absence of a right to interdict, the right to shadow and monitor North 
Korean shipping will almost certainly generate a confrontation at some point. 
In addition to interdiction, the UNSC resolution explicitly provides for the use of financial means 
for stopping the flow of WMD-related trade (UNSC 2009, paragraph 18). These measures are potentially 
more sweeping than those related to trade sanctions per se, since the resolution permits the blocking of 
transfers and even the freezing of any assets that “could contribute” to North Korea’s weapons programs 
or activities. Such a provision is open to broader interpretation than trade sanctions, since it could in 
principle affect the finances of any firm involved in both weapons-related and nonweapons-related 
activities. 
Finally, the resolution establishes a new process for overseeing the sanctions effort by creating a 
panel of experts. The panel will oversee the implementation of both UNSCR 1718 and UNSCR 1874, 
monitor efforts on the part of member states, and provide recommendations to the UN Security Council. 
The passage of this new resolution has an important political function. In particular, it shows the 
growing depth of Chinese disaffection with North Korea’s behavior since the missile and nuclear tests of 
2006. This resolution is by far the strongest public Chinese signal to North Korea to date. The resolution 
also garnered support from Russia.
Nonetheless, there are several reasons to believe that the sanctions effort is not likely to yield 
immediate results and could indeed backfire in the short run. First, the North Koreans have typically 
responded to pressure not by complying but by escalating. The most recent cycle of escalation, 
culminating in the nuclear test, was in fact triggered by UN actions. 
Second, the sanctions may have a perverse domestic political effect in North Korea. As we have 
seen, the course of government policy over the last several years has been hostile toward deeper foreign 
engagement. Kim Jong-il’s stroke in August 2008 and the onset of succession politics has no doubt 
only exacerbated such tendencies; no one wants to be vulnerable to charges of apostasy. In such a highly 
uncertain political environment, sanctions may even strengthen conservative forces and provide a further 
justification for circling the wagons.
A final reason why sanctions may not be effective has to do with the changing geography of North 
Korea’s trade and investment relations described above. Those countries most inclined to sanction North 
Korea do not trade or invest with North Korea and have even seen economic relations decline. Japan, 
once an important mainstay of the North Korean economy through transfers, has implemented an 
embargo (though circumvention through third countries is reputedly easy). The United States maintains 
modest restrictions on trade with North Korea (reconfirmed on June 24, 2009 by President Barack 
Obama) but trade is so minuscule that Washington has little leverage to gain through additional bilateral 
trade restrictions. Indeed, the North Koreans even rejected the last important economic link to the 
United States by declining to continue a generous food aid program negotiated last year. Aid from South 
Korea has dropped to a trickle, and as we have seen commercial relations through the KIC have also been 
held hostage by new North Korean demands to renegotiate contracts.
What about financial sanctions? This particular form of sanction does not require multilateral 
coordination. Foreign banking institutions that conduct significant business in the United States have a 
strong interest in avoiding institutions that the US Treasury has identified as engaged in illicit finance. 
This was demonstrated clearly in 2005, when the US Treasury signaled that a small Macau bank, Banco 
Delta Asia, was possibly engaged in money laundering activities on North Korea’s behalf. Without any 
further action, the bank immediately suffered a run on its deposits and was forced into receivership, 
freezing $25 million of North Korean funds. The issue became a major sticking point in the Six Party 
Talks, but also appeared to motivate the North Koreans to return to the talks, setting the stage for the 
agreements reached in 2007. However it is doubtful that similar measures taken now would have the 
same effect, as the North Koreans have undoubtedly attempted to diversify their financial linkages. 
coNclUSioN: imPlicATioNS for NorTh KoreA’S NUcleAr ProgrAm AND 
ProliferATioN AcTiviTieS
What implications, if any, does this economic story have for the politics of North Korea’s nuclear 
program and proliferation activities? The first, and most general, point goes to the question of the 
regime’s intentions. It is virtually impossible for outsiders to be confident that they understand the inner 
workings of North Korean decision-making. But it is important to ask whether North Korea’s military 
and diplomatic signals are aligned with other signals, including developments in the North Korean 
political economy. Had the North Korean leadership been pursuing a reformist path since the onset of 
the crisis, however gradually, it would have provided a signal that the country was open to economic 
inducements. 
However, the evidence on this score is not comforting. The North Korean economy is indeed 
becoming more open, but the leadership remains highly ambivalent about this development and about 
reform more generally and has shown little interest in economic carrots as a result. To the contrary, the 
willingness to terminate the US food aid program, the government’s behavior with respect to the KIC, 
and the ongoing meddling in the border trade shows a regime that is either indifferent to, or actively 
hostile toward, economic engagement. 
A second conclusion has to do with the political geography of North Korea’s external economic 
relations. An unintended consequence of the crisis has been to push North Korea into a closer economic 
relationship with China and other trading partners that show little interest in political quid-pro-quos, let 
alone sanctions. Put differently, North Korea appears to have rearranged its external economic relations in 
order to reduce the impact that traditional sanctions could have. 
Consequently China has become even more central to any effective sanctions effort. Today China is 
North Korea’s largest trading partner, accounting for one-third or more of its trade, and is the country’s 
most generous aid donor. Cutting off critical Chinese oil shipments, much less a complete trade embargo, 
would bring the country to its knees.
But China has ambivalent, conflicting interests with respect to North Korea. Some Chinese analysts 
believe that China benefits from having an allied buffer state on its border and may even regard North 
Korea as a useful pawn in its rivalries with the United States and India, acting as its proxy in dealings 
with Iran and Pakistan. China also has concerns that excessive pressure on the regime could provoke its 
collapse, in the worst case sending millions of North Korean refugees into China or even triggering US 
and South Korean military intervention. A stable, nuclear-armed North Korea may be preferable to an 
unstable one, nuclear or not. These considerations serve to limit the degree of pressure that Beijing is 
willing to bring to bear.
Yet North Korean provocations also have adverse strategic consequences for China as well. To date, 
they have served to push South Korea, Japan, and the United States closer together and could trigger a 
major arms race in Northeast Asia from which China could be the loser. Security concerns have already 
triggered greater interest in theater missile defenses and even speculation about whether Japan would “go 
nuclear.” 
It is not beyond the realm of possibility that China has in fact reached the limits of its tolerance and 
that some coordinated or even unilateral action on its part might be forthcoming. It is still too soon to tell 
what China will do, but preliminary signals suggest an increased willingness to impose limited sanctions. 
But the history of sanctions suggests that they are unlikely to induce countries to abandon core political 
goals, which the nuclear weapons program appears to be in the North Korean case (Hufbauer et al. 
2007). It would take draconian sanctions rigorously applied by China and South Korea in concert with 
others to have a plausible chance of attaining this goal, and this outcome appears unlikely to be obtained. 
In the absence of such coordination, the United States can still exercise leverage if it can identify 
how and where North Korea finances its international trade and goes aggressively after financial 
intermediaries as it did in the Banco Delta Asia case. As we have argued, this particular form of sanction 
does not require multilateral coordination, although North Korea has undoubtedly taken steps to try to 
minimize this risk.
As a small country increasingly dependent on foreign trade and investment, North Korea would 
appear highly vulnerable to external economic pressure. But given the extreme priority that the regime 
places on its military capacity, it is unlikely that the pain the world can bring to bear will be sufficient to 
induce North Korea to surrender its nuclear weapons. Moreover, the change in North Korea’s trading 
partners has served to mitigate the risk of such sanctions, at least to some extent. The promise of lifting 
existing sanctions may constitute one incentive for a successor government to reassess the country’s 
military and diplomatic positions, but we should not expect them to have a strong effect in the short run, 
particularly if the country’s behavior is driven by domestic political considerations.
A third conclusion has to do with the incentives of proliferation activities. There is some evidence 
that North Korea moderated its missile proliferation activities during periods when rapprochement 
with the United States, and to a lesser extent Japan, was a priority; the late Clinton period provides an 
example. However, in the absence of such an interest, the incentives to engage in arms transfers increase. 
Indeed, they arguably become greater because of the declining prospects for trade, investment, and 
assistance from the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Western Europe. Given that the United 
States has even less leverage over customers such as Iran and Syria than it does over China, the only policy 
options for dealing with this particular form of trade expansion are much more direct, including sanctions 
on North Korea’s Middle Eastern trading partners or a test of the direct interdiction model that is the 
untested core of the PSI. 
A fourth conclusion concerns the more-transformative conception of engagement that undergirded 
the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations’ approaches to North Korea. The engagement bet 
was not an irrational one. If North Korea had embarked on a more-robust reformist path, the postulated 
mechanisms of long-run transformation through engagement might well have taken place. Increased 
trade, investment, and aid would have contributed not only to a deeper engagement in the world 
economy but been part and parcel of an internal transformation as well. 
Yet as we have seen, the North Korean economy is structured in such a way that outside economic 
ties are still largely monopolized by state-owned enterprises and other gatekeepers, such as the military 
in the case of the KIC. Under such circumstances, the precise design of engagement policies requires 
very close scrutiny. Direct transfers to the regime obviously will not have the same transformative effects 
as private investment and trade. Even nominally commercial relations can be exploited if the North 
Korean counterparties believe that these relations are ultimately political in nature, subsidized, and thus 
vulnerable to blackmail; again, the KIC is an important example. If economic ties are truly commercial 
in nature, those choosing to trade and invest with North Korea do so at their own risk. Under these 
circumstances, private actors will make economic decisions fully factoring in political risk, and North 
Korea will bear the costs if it chooses to renege on commitments or fails to provide a welcoming policy 
environment. 
Finally, we conclude by underlining that the international community faces what might be 
called a “latent” humanitarian problem with respect to North Korea. These concerns were muted by a 
somewhat better-than-expected harvest in 2008, and probably by commercial purchases of food in the 
winter and early spring of 2008–09.11 Even if North Korea does muddle through this crop cycle and 
the termination of the 500,000 metric ton food aid program, there is little indication that the country 
is capable of feeding itself. As a result, the prospect of a recurrence of food shortages in the medium 
term is high. As in the past, the peculiar difficulty of dealing with North Korea stems in part from the 
humanitarian dilemma the country poses to the international community: It is difficult to turn away from 
the substantial suffering that the regime imposes on its own population, but increasingly unproductive to 
extend economic assistance in the face of entrenched resistance to broader reforms.
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Table 1     North Korea’s direction of trade: top ten trading partners, 2004–07
North Korean imports
2004 Percent 2005 Percent 2006 Percent 2007 Percent
1. China . China 1. China . China .
. South Korea 1. South Korea 1.0 South Korea .1 South Korea .
. Thailand .0 Algeria .1 Algeria . Algeria .
. Russia . Thailand . Thailand .0 Thailand .
. Algeria . Russia . Russia .1 South Africa .
. Brazil . Congo . Congo . Congo .
. India . India . India . Brazil .
. Netherlands . Singapore . South Africa . Russia .0
. Japan .0 Brazil .1 Brazil 1. India .
10. Congo . Japan 1. Singapore 1. Saudi Arabia 1.
North Korean exports 
2004 Percent 2005 Percent 2006 Percent 2007 Percent
1. China 1. China . South Korea 0.0 South Korea .
. South Korea 1. South Korea 1. China .0 China .
. Japan 11. Japan . Thailand . Venezuela .
. Thailand . Thailand .0 Brazil . Brazil .
. Brazil . Brazil . Japan . India .
. Qatar . India . Greece . Myanmar .
. Myanmar 1. Saudi Arabia .1 India . Netherlands 1.
. France 1. Myanmar .0 Myanmar . Thailand 1.
. Germany 1. Germany .0 Saudi Arabia 1. Russia 1.
10. Nigeria 1. France 1. Paraguay 1. Saudi Arabia 1.
Sources:  KOTRA, IMF DOTS, UN COMTRADE.









figure 1     North Korean Trade, 1990–2008
Sources: KOTRA, IMF DOTS, UN COMTRADE.
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figure 2     North Korean trade with the world versus with the middle east
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Source: General Administration of Customs, People’s Republic of China.
figure 3     china-DPrK trade by chinese firm ownership
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figure 4     china’s trade with North Korea, 2000–09
million US dollars
Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 00, and KITA (Korean International Trade Association).
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figure 5     South Korea’s trade with North Korea, 2001–09
million US dollars








  Exports to North Korea
  Imports from North Korea
  Total trade (three-month central moving average)




























1  1  1  1  1  1  1  000  001  00  00  00  00  00  00
figure 6     china and South Korea aid and exports to North Korea, 1993–2007
million US dollars
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Sources: Cho et al. (00), Korea International Trade Association (KITA) Trade Statistics, and authors’ calculations.